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331 
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: AMERICAN ATTITUDES AND 
PRACTICES IN THE PROSECUTION OF 
CHARLES “CHUCKIE” TAYLOR JR. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, there was a growing 
movement in the international community to punish gross violations of 
international law such as genocide, crimes against humanity, torture, and 
war crimes.
1
 This pursuit of accountability has taken a number of forms, 
including the use of domestic prosecutions, international tribunals, and 
universal jurisdiction.
2
 Although concerns about sovereignty have 
discouraged the use of universal jurisdiction in the past, more recently
3
 
states have expressed greater willingness to utilize it to punish individual 
offenders and safeguard developing human rights norms.
4
 Commentators 
have traced this trend to the post-World War II prosecutions of Axis 
leaders, an early example of the international system holding individuals 
responsible for violations of international law and norms.
5
 Since then, a 
number of states have chosen to try individual offenders for crimes 
defined by international law when neither the crimes nor the offenders 
 
 
 1. CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE FOR MASS ATROCITIES: A REVOLUTION IN 
ACCOUNTABILITY 13 (2005). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. at 14. It has long been the rule that the ―exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
appropriate when a sufficient connection exists between the controversy in question and the nation 
seeking to exercise jurisdiction.‖ Anthony E. Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to 
Prosecute Violations of the Law of War: Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. REV. 699, 
710 (2007). Sriram notes that universal jurisdiction ―may constitute a significant challenge to national 
sovereignty,‖ and could also be construed as a violation of the principle of non-interference in 
domestic affairs enshrined in Article 2, sec. 7 of the U.N. Charter. States exercising such jurisdiction 
attempt to justify it by asserting that certain crimes are so heinous that they threaten the well-being of 
the international community or of humanity in general. SRIRAM, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 4. Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 B.C. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 222 
(2008).  
 5. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 146 (1997). The authors 
contend that international attitudes toward liability for human rights abuses sanctioned by states began 
to change after World War I and saw a far more marked shift after World War II. Id. at 4–6. ―The 
Nuremberg Tribunal established, among other things, the concept of individual criminal responsibility 
for crimes against humanity.‖ Erika R. George, After Atrocity Examples from Africa: The Right to 
Education and the Role of Law in Restoration, Recovery, and Accountability, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT‘L L. 
REV. 59, 61 (2007).  
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have a relational nexus to the forum state.
6
 The United States appeared to 
join this group in 1994 when it passed 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340 and 2340A 
(1994).
7
 This statute, also known as the Extraterritorial Torture Statute 
(―ETS‖), was designed to codify and implement the nation‘s 
responsibilities as a party to the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (―CAT‖).8 It went 
largely unused, however, until 2006, when Charles ―Chuckie‖ Taylor Jr., 
the son of the former President of Liberia, was indicted under its auspices.
9
 
While Taylor was originally charged with passport fraud,
10
 a superseding 
indictment obtained in December 2006 additionally included two counts of 
torture and one count of using a firearm in a violent crime.
11
 Taylor Jr., an 
American citizen, was indicted as a result of his activities in Liberia as the 
leader of the Anti-Terrorist Unit (―ATU‖), an ―elite military force that 
provided security‖ to Charles Taylor Sr.,12 which was formed shortly after 
 
 
 6. Peter Ford, Answering for Rights Crimes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 18, 1999, at 1. The 
list of nations engaging in the exercise of universal jurisdiction in recent years includes France, 
Belgium, Germany, Denmark, and Spain (which famously attempted to prosecute former Chilean 
leader Augusto Pinochet). Id. 
 7. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2006), torture is defined as: ―[A]n act committed by a person acting 
under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other 
than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or 
control,‖ while 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1994) provides in relevant part:  
(a) Offense: Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to 
any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or 
imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 
(b) Juridiction: There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in subsection (a) if— 
 (1) the alleged offender is a national of the United States; or  
 (2) the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of 
the victim or alleged offender. 
 8. Elise Keppler, Shirley Jean & J. Paxton Marshall, First Prosecution in the United States for 
Torture Committed Abroad: The Trial of Charles „Chuckie‟ Taylor, Jr., 15 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, 
Spring/Summer 2008, at 18, 18–19. Article 5 of the CAT indicates that parties to the Convention are 
required to prosecute alleged perpetrators of torture when they are present in a party‘s territory. 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 5, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1988 U.S.T. 202, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114. 
 9. Siobhan Morrissey, Torture Law Gets First Test, 5 No. 49 ABA J. E-REPORT 3, 3 (2006) 
(Westlaw, ABAJEREP).  
 10. Abby Goodnough, Son of Ex-Liberian Leader Pleads Not Guilty to Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 
6, 2006, at A14. 
 11. David Johnston, Son of Liberia‟s Ex-leader Charged in Miami under Anti-Torture Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A5. The indictment alleged that Taylor Jr. applied electric shocks to the 
victim‘s genitalia and authorized the pouring of scalding water on the victim‘s hands and body, the 
application of a hot iron to the victim‘s skin, and the rubbing of salt into the resulting wounds. 
Indictment, U.S. v. Belfast, No. 06-2075 (S.D. Fla., Dec. 06, 2006). Additional counts concerning 
other victims were added at a later date. Keppler, Jean & Marshall, supra note 8, at 20.  
 12. Goodnough, supra note 10, at A14.  
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he was elected President of Liberia.
13
 His father‘s tenure as President saw 
a resurgence of civil conflict from 1999 to 2003, as various rebel groups 
challenged Taylor Sr.‘s rule.14 The ATU, used as an enforcement 
mechanism, has been accused of crimes ranging from ―violent assaults, 
beating people to death, rape, and burning civilians alive.‖15 Taylor was 
convicted on October 30, 2008,
16
 and sentenced in January 2009 to ninety-
seven years in federal prison.
17
 
The indictment sparked discussion in some quarters as marking the 
beginning of a United States policy of exercising greater extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to protect human rights.
18
 A number of bloggers welcomed the 
indictment and trial as representing a possible thawing of American 
attitudes toward universal jurisdiction: ―Who knows—at this rate, the US 
might even eventually comply with the Geneva Conventions and adopt 
universal jurisdiction for grave breaches!‖19 Based on the long history of 
American reluctance to use its courts to prosecute individuals for offenses 
unconnected to the United States in contrast to its Western European 
allies, the special circumstances of this case, and the issues inherent in the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction to punish atrocities, there is a strong 
argument that U.S. actions are mere window-dressing rather than a 
substantial move toward embracing universal criminal jurisdiction as a 
tool for enforcing international norms. 
 
 
 13. Keppler, Jean & Marshall, supra note 8, at 19.  
 14. Id. See Chernor Jalloh & Alhagi Marong, Ending Impunity: The Case for War Crimes Trials 
in Liberia, 1 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2005) for in-depth discussion of the Liberian conflict and the 
abuses perpetrated by both the Taylor regime and the various rebel groups either aligned with or 
against him. See also Joanne Brockman, Liberia: The Case for Changing U.N. Processes for 
Humanitarian Interventions, 22 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 711 (2004) for an examination of the roots of the 
Liberian conflict, Charles Taylor‘s role in it and the related conflict in Sierra Leone, responses by the 
African Union and the United Nations, and Taylor‘s indictment by the U.N. Special Court for Sierra 
Leone for war crimes.  
 15. Keppler, Jean & Marshall, supra note 8, at 19.  
 16. Carrie Johnson, Jurors in U.S. Convict Son of Ex-Liberian President Taylor, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 31, 2008, at A10. 
 17. Carmen Gentile, Son of Ex-president of Liberia Gets 97-Year Prison Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 2009, at A14. Prosecutors had originally requested a sentence of 147 years. He was also 
ordered to pay $7,500 in restitution to each of the seven victims who were named as part of his 
indictment. 
 18. See IntLawGrrls, Extraterritorial Torture Case Moves Forward, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot. 
com/2007/09/extraterritorial-torture-cases-moves.html (Sept. 12, 2007, 09:43) for the proposition that 
the case could set an important foundation for American jurisprudence in the area. See also Opinio 
Juris, Universal Jurisdiction Trial Begins in U.S.; No Signs of the Apocalypse Thus Far, http:// 
opiniojuris.org/2008/09/24/universal-jurisdiction-trial-begins-in-us-no-signs-of-the-apocalypse-so-far 
(Sept. 24, 2008, 23:43 EDT); Johnston, supra note 11, at A14 (―Human rights groups praised the 
indictment, saying the use of the law set an important precedent in an effort to stop abuses around the 
world.‖). 
 19. Opinio Juris, supra note 18.  
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This Note uses the Taylor case as a lens through which to examine the 
United States‘ attitude toward universal jurisdiction. It argues that, rather 
than evincing a new direction in jurisprudence, the Taylor indictment is a 
fundamentally conservative step, as the evidence indicates U.S. reluctance 
to exercise this type of jurisdiction as a matter of course. It explores 
American practice of universal civil jurisdiction, attitudes in the United 
States toward universal criminal jurisdiction, and the special factors in the 
Taylor case that made the indictment possible. This Note also explores 
European practices in contrast to U.S. conservatism, and argues in favor of 
American pragmatism and moderation in this area.  
Part II examines the bases for jurisdiction in the international context. 
Part III explores how the United States has chosen or not chosen to 
exercise that jurisdiction, and the governmental attitude toward that 
exercise. Part IV compares the Taylor case to cases in Western Europe to 
illustrate how reluctant the United States has been to use universal 
criminal jurisdiction and how conservative the Taylor indictment actually 
is. Part V is an argument in favor of the American position.  
II. JURISDICTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
Although there are multiple types of jurisdiction—prescriptive, 
adjudicative, and enforcement
20—international law has primarily been 
concerned with prescriptive, which is the capacity of an individual nation-
state to make its laws applicable to ―activities, relations, and status of 
persons or a person‘s interest in property.‖21 
The exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in the international context is 
hemmed by a series of limitations, and only exercises that fit within these 
constrained limitations are legal.
22
 The most basic theory of jurisdiction is 
territorial; jurisdiction is furnished over people, things, or acts within the 
boundaries of a given state.
23
 The nationality theory gives states the ability 
to exercise jurisdiction over their own citizens, and customary 
 
 
 20. Eric Engle, The Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims‟ Protection Act: Jurisdictional 
Foundations and Procedural Obstacles, 14 WILLAMETTE J. INT‘L L. & DISP. RESOL. 1, 25–27 (2006).  
 21. Adam Isaac Hasson, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity on Trial: 
Noriega, Pinochet, and Milosevic—Trends in Political Accountability and Transnational Criminal 
Law, 25 B.C. INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 135 (2002). Jurisdiction to adjudicate is concerned with a 
court‘s ability to hear a case ―regardless of the law.‖ Jurisdiction to enforce is use of a state‘s 
enforcement bodies. Engle, supra note 20, at 26–27.  
 22. Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 323–24 
(2001).  
 23. Hasson, supra note 21, at 135. 
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international law indicates that that jurisdiction may be exercised wherever 
the citizen is located.
24
  
The first two jurisdictional bases seem to be the most widely 
accepted.
25
 States have long exercised jurisdiction within their own 
borders,
26
 and it has always been the province of individual nations to 
define their power vis-à-vis their own citizens.
27
 Taking this into account, 
it seems that the United States has come from a position of traditionalism 
in the writing of the ETS, as 18 U.S.C. § 2340A purports only to grant 
jurisdiction if the offender is a U.S. citizen or is found in the United 
States.
28
 The Taylor indictment reflects both of these principles, as he is 
both a citizen of the United States and was found within its territory.
29
 
There are three other major bases of international prescriptive 
jurisdiction that are less widely accepted than territoriality or nationality.
30
 
The first of these is the protective principle, which allows nation-states to 
exercise jurisdiction over non-citizens who harm the state‘s national 
security.
31
 More contentious and less accepted
32
 is the passive personality 
principle, which allows a state to exercise jurisdiction when one of its 
citizens is a victim.
33
  
 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Eugene Kontorovich, The Inefficiency of Universal Jurisdiction, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 
393 (2008). Kontorovich notes that the territoriality and nationality principles largely square up with 
the Westphalian system concerned with maintaining limitations on international incursions into 
domestic sovereignty. Other commentators have noted that the nationality theory‘s application in the 
United States is somewhat more restrictive than elsewhere: ―There is no general principle that U.S. 
criminal law be applied to nationals wherever they may be.‖ Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan Stigall, 
Wings for Talons: The Case for the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Sexual Exploitation of Children 
through Cyberspace, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 109, 124–25 (2004). That being said, nationality is still one 
of the primary methods the United States utilizes to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id. at 125. See 
also Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli: Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT‘L L. REV. 1, 20–22 (2007).  
 26. Sterio, supra note 4, at 229. 
 27. Id.  
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(b)(1), (2) (1994). See supra note 7 for the full text of the relevant 
provisions.  
 29. Goodnough, supra note 10, at A14.  
 30. Kontorovich, supra note 25, at 393. These bases of jurisdiction are much more broad than 
nationality and territoriality, and as such, have met with some resistance. Id.  
 31. Id. at 394. This principle has had difficulty obtaining wide support because of ―loose notions 
of harm and causation‖ that could lead its exercise to resemble universal jurisdiction in certain cases. 
Id. According to Adam Hasson, most European countries have accepted this approach. Hasson, supra 
note 21, at 135. It appears likely that the United States supports this principle as well, considering the 
position of the Bush Administration toward ―enemy combatants‖ following the September 11 attacks.  
 32. Kontorovich, supra note 25, at 394. Passive personality has generally failed to receive 
acceptance on a wide scale in the international arena.  
 33. Hasson, supra note 21, at 136.  
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The last principle, universal jurisdiction, has proven to be the most 
controversial.
34
 This principle makes it possible, and perhaps even 
mandatory, for states to prosecute certain heinous crimes as defined by 
international law.
35
 This jurisdiction requires no nexus with the forum 
state, as the location of the act and the citizenship of victims and 
perpetrators are irrelevant.
36
 The exercise of such jurisdiction is grounded 
in the assertion that there are certain crimes that are so heinous that they 
damage the international legal system or humanity as a whole.
37
 
This exercise of jurisdiction has been classed as ―absolute‖ universal 
jurisdiction.
38
 According to the International Court of Justice, this type of 
jurisdiction is to be differentiated from ―relative‖ universal jurisdiction,39 
which is extraterritorial jurisdiction exercised under the auspices of one of 
the other principles.
40
 While many states have chosen to exercise what can 
be viewed as absolute universal jurisdiction,
41
 the Taylor indictment is an 
indication that the United States appears willing to exercise jurisdiction 
only when it falls into the traditional categories of territoriality and 
nationality.
42
 
III. AMERICAN PRACTICES OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
An examination of United States policy in the area of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction indicates an extended history of its exercise in specific 
contexts. American courts have long exercised relative universal civil 
 
 
 34. Id.  
 35. SRIRAM, supra note 1, at 13.  
 36. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT‘L L. 81, 88 (2001).  
 37. SRIRAM, supra note 1, at 15. Genocide, war crimes, terrorism and torture are the most 
common bases for invoking universal jurisdiction.  
 38. Engle, supra note 20, at 28.  
 39. Id. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14) 
(Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume at 39–40) and Joint Separate Opinion of Higgins, Kooijmans, 
and Buergenthal at 74–75 for the original discussion of the difference between absolute and relative 
universal jurisdiction.  
 40. Engle, supra note 20, at 28.  
 41. See Ford, supra note 6 for a list of countries that have participated in the exercise of absolute 
universal jurisdiction.  
 42. This position seems to be supported by the statements made by members of the Department 
of Justice at the press conference announcing Taylor Jr.‘s indictment: ―We are determined through our 
work . . . that the United States will not serve as a safe haven for individuals who engage in human 
rights abuses.‖ U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Press Conference at Washington, D.C. 3 (Dec. 6, 2006) 
[hereinafter Press Conference Announcing Indictment] (transcript available at TRANSCRIPT OF PRESS 
CONFERENCE ANNOUNCING INDICTMENT OF ROY BELFAST JR. AKA CHUCKIE TAYLOR ON TORTURE 
CHARGES (2006), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/hrsp/pr/speeches/2006/12-06-06fisher-speech-belfast-
indict.pdf.).  
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jurisdiction,
43
 but the evidence indicates that universal criminal 
jurisdiction has not met with the same recognition.
44
 Indeed, it appears that 
the United States favors the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction as 
opposed to criminal, and any exercise of criminal jurisdiction will be 
guided by context and political expediency.
45
  
The Alien Tort Claims Act
46
 was originally passed in 1789
47
 and went 
largely unused until the 1980s.
48
 In 1980, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
49
 
which interpreted the statute to allow the assertion of claims based on 
violations of human rights that the court found to be part of the law of 
nations.
50
 The decision indicates that U.S. courts should be open to 
individuals who can prove the violation of ―well-established, universally 
recognized norms of international law.‖51 The claim is available whether 
or not the tort was committed on U.S. territory or if the perpetrator was a 
U.S. citizen.
52
 The courts have subsequently seen a great number of cases, 
three of which have reached the Supreme Court.
53
 
 
 
 43. The Alien Tort Claims Act, which gives federal courts jurisdiction over suits where a non-
citizen claims a breach of international law, was passed by the first U.S. Congress in 1789. SRIRAM, 
supra note 1, at 67. Although no direct connection between the controversy, the parties and the United 
States is required, the defendant must be found in and be served in the United States. Id. 
 44. See Steven R. Ratner, Belgium‟s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 888 
(2003), for an examination of the American response to Belgium‘s sweeping invocation of universal 
jurisdiction in its courts. See also Michael Verhaeghe, The Political Funeral Procession for the 
Belgian UJ Statute, in INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES 139 (Wolfgang 
Kaleck, Michael Ratner, Tobias Singelstein & Peter Weiss eds., 2007).  
 45. There have been a number of investigations undertaken against people in the United States 
who are accused of having participated in torture, but no other criminal charges have been sought. 
Keppler, Jean & Marshall, supra note 8, at 22. Indeed, the vast majority of actions taken by the United 
States in dealing with human rights violators are deportations or other immigration charges. No Safe 
Haven: Accountability for Human Rights Violators in the United States, Testimony Before the 
Subcommittee on Human Rights and the Law, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Pamela Merchant, 
Executive Director, Center for Justice and Accountability).  
 46. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (―The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.‖). 
 47. See supra note 6. 
 48. Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil 
Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT‘L L. 142, 146 (2006).  
 49. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 50. Id. at 880 (―[W]e find that an act of torture committed by a state official against one held in 
detention violates established norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of 
nations.‖). 
 51. Id. at 888.  
 52. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 48, at 146.  
 53. Engle, supra note 20, at 9.  
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This law was bolstered by the passage of the Torture Victims 
Protection Act (―TVPA‖)54 in 1992, which allows both U.S. citizens and 
non-citizens to maintain a cause of action in tort.
55
 However, both require 
the ability of a court to exert personal jurisdiction over the defendant,
56
 
making the exercise of universal jurisdiction less expansive than it would 
initially appear. Additionally, the Supreme Court narrowed the application 
of the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
57
 by reading the 
statute to allow causes of action only for those violations of ―binding 
customary rules‖58 that create ―norm[s] of customary international law 
[that are] well defined [enough] to support the creation of a federal 
remedy.‖59 
As compared to the practice of allowing civil liability under the Alien 
Tort Statute, the Taylor case seems far less groundbreaking. At least since 
the handing down of Filartiga in 1980, the United States has served as an 
important forum for civil claims stemming from violations of international 
human rights norms anywhere in the world.
60
 It seems that, rather than 
moving in the direction of other Western countries and providing a forum 
for criminal litigation of international law violations, the United States has 
chosen to honor its treaty obligations through the use of a very broad 
exercise of universal civil jurisdiction. 
This assertion appears to be borne out by an examination of the United 
States‘ reaction to Belgium‘s passage of a broad universal criminal 
jurisdiction statute. Passed in June 1993,
61
 the statute was designed to 
allow Belgium to punish domestically ―serious breaches of international 
humanitarian law.‖62 The breadth of the statute made it possible for crimes 
with no link whatsoever to Belgium to be tried there.
63
 Initially, there were 
few complaints about the law,
64
 and a few cases were successfully tried.
65
 
 
 
 54. 106 Stat. 73 (1992).  
 55. Engle, supra note 20, at 17. 
 56. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 48, at 148–49.  
 57. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 58. Id. at 738. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Indeed, many states including Australia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have 
complained of the extent of the jurisdiction exercised by the United States courts through the 
application of the Alien Tort Statute and the TVPA. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 48, at 147. 
Additionally, the International Court of Justice, in the joint opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and 
Buergenthal, supra note 27, has also noted that the ATS and TVPA provide a ―very broad form of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.‖ Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 39, at 77.  
 61. Verhaeghe, supra note 44, at 139.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Ratner, supra note 44, at 889.  
 64. Verhaeghe, supra note 44, at 139. 
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More contentious complaints began to be filed,
66
 however, and the 
situation erupted in 2003 when an investigation of former U.S. President 
George H. W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and Secretary of State 
Colin Powell was requested by Iraqis in relation to the first Gulf War.
67
 
The United States immediately began exerting pressure on Belgium to 
rescind the statute, although there was no real indication that the claim 
would go to trial.
68
 Although Belgium amended the statute to provide 
some limitations,
69
 the United States mounted economic and political 
pressure on Belgium to do away with it entirely.
70
 Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld publicly humiliated the Belgian government by 
announcing that the United States would not be willing to invest in a new 
NATO headquarters there.
71
 He gave the Belgians an ultimatum: fix the 
statute within six months or suffer the consequences.
72
 Belgium complied, 
passing a law that required a link in order to exercise jurisdiction.
73
 It 
seems evident that U.S. behavior evinces hostility toward the idea of 
utilizing expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction as a means of enforcing 
international law and norms. 
With the foregoing points in mind, it seems that the Taylor case is more 
symbolic than substantial. Steven Ratner has argued that there are factors 
that make certain cases more attractive for the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction than others:
74
 presence of the accused in the forum state; 
 
 
 65. In 2001, four perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide were tried and convicted in Belgian 
courts. Ratner, supra note 44, at 889. 
 66. Complaints were filed against Ariel Sharon, Fidel Castro, Saddam Hussein, former 
Democratic Republic of Congo Minister for Foreign Affairs Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (which gave 
rise to the ICJ case cited supra note 39), and former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani. Id. at 890. 
 67. Id. The Iraqis alleged that Bush Sr. was responsible for war crimes committed during Gulf 
War I. Verhaeghe, supra note 44, at 141.  
 68. Ratner, supra note 44, at 890; Verhaeghe, supra note 44, at 145. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell warned the government of Belgium that the statute threatened its status as the headquarters of 
the North American Treaty Organization, as allowing investigations of officials visiting there would 
jeopardize relations. Ratner, supra note 44, at 890. Verhaeghe notes additionally that the term 
―complaint‖ does not have the same meaning in the Belgian legal system. A complaint in Belgium is 
merely the complainant‘s expression of grievance, and does not form the foundation for an indictment 
as it does in the United States. Verhaeghe, supra note 44, at 145.  
 69. Ratner, supra note 44, at 890. The amendments meant that the controls on cases that had no 
substantial link were much more stringent. As a result, only the federal prosecutor had the power to 
initiate cases. The prosecutor also retained the power to refuse to proceed if the complaint was 
―manifestly unfounded.‖ Id. 
 70. Id. at 891. 
 71. W. Chadwick Austin & Antony Barone Kolenc, Who‟s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? The 
International Criminal Court as a Weapon of Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 291, 
321–22 (2006).  
 72. Verhaeghe, supra note 44, at 143. 
 73. Ratner, supra note 44, at 891.  
 74. Id. at 894–95.  
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severity of the alleged atrocities; the strength of the evidence against the 
defendant; the sense that the case is not driven by politics and does not 
amount to taking sides in an unfinished conflict; the absence of an 
effective judiciary in the state where the events occurred; the special links 
between the state where the events occurred and the potential forum; the 
defendant‘s political powerlessness; and the absence of opposition from 
any state to the prosecution.
75
  
The list of factors seems to indicate that the Taylor case was the 
proverbial ―perfect storm‖: Taylor was in U.S. custody;76 the alleged 
atrocities were fairly severe;
77
 there was substantial evidence against 
him;
78
 there was a worldwide recognition that the Taylor regime had been 
a brutal one;
79
 Liberia lacked infrastructure, much less an effective 
judiciary;
80
 while never a U.S. colony, it maintains close ties to the United 
States because of its origins;
81
 and Taylor Jr. was simply a U.S. citizen 
without money or political clout.
82
 By virtue of his status as a U.S. citizen, 
it was unlikely that there would be an outcry against the country of his 
nationality instituting charges.
83
 Taking the entirety of the circumstances 
into account, Taylor Jr. seemed to provide the perfect opportunity for the 
 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Keppler, Jean & Marshall, supra note 8, at 19.  
 77. Id. at 20. As mentioned previously, Taylor was accused of some very serious behavior, 
including summary executions; ―lock[ing] [others] in a hole in the ground covered with iron bars and 
wire; order[ing] cutting the genitals of prisoners; . . . and burning and shocking various body parts of 
prisoners.‖ Id. Other incidents are detailed in the text. Id. 
 78. The strength of the evidence was attested to in the press conference held to announce his 
indictment. Alice Fisher, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Department 
of Justice, stated that the case was brought because ―it was a good case that we could prove, and these 
cases are hard cases. In this case alone, we had agents from . . . three different agencies flying all over 
the world to get evidence from people that might not live in cities, from people outside of cities . . . .‖ 
Press Conference Announcing Indictment, supra note 42, at 3. 
 79. Charles Taylor Sr. originally claimed exile in Nigeria, but the U.N.-backed Special Court for 
Sierra Leone later indicted him, recognizing the suffering his organization inflicted on both his own 
people and those of neighboring Sierra Leone. Brockman, supra note 14, at 738–39. He is now 
awaiting trial on war crimes charges in The Hague, The Netherlands. Johnson, supra note 16.  
 80. Rena L. Scott, Moving from Impunity to Accountability in Post-war Liberia: Possibilities, 
Cautions, and Challenges, 33 INT‘L J. LEGAL INFO. 345, 363 (2005).  
 81. Liberia, while never officially colonized by any of the Western states, was the product of 
work by the American Colonization Society and other African-American groups who wished to assist 
freed slaves with the process of repatriation. These former slaves became a faction within Liberian 
society known as the ―Americo-Liberians,‖ and they ran the country until the 1970s. Id. at 353–54.  
 82. At the time of his initial arraignment on passport fraud charges, Taylor Jr. informed the court 
that he lacked the funds necessary to retain private counsel. Goodnough, supra note 10. Clearly, 
whatever political influence Taylor Jr. possessed lessened once his father stepped down and 
disappeared entirely by the time he was transferred to The Hague to stand trial. 
 83. Keppler, Jean & Marshall, supra note 8, at 20.  
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United States to show compliance with CAT without risking an 
international incident.  
This stance is to be contrasted with the case of Major Tomas Ricardo 
Anderson Kohatsu, a former Peruvian army official.
84
 Kohatsu was 
allegedly linked to ―horrendous crimes‖85 during his tenure as a Peruvian 
intelligence officer
86
 and was detained when he flew to the United States 
to attend a human rights conference.
87
 The Department of Justice sought to 
indict him under the ETS, but ultimately the State Department blocked the 
indictment.
88
 The special agent in charge of Kohatsu‘s arrest stated that 
―[b]ecause of political sensitivities . . . the State Department jumped in.‖89 
At stake was the United States‘ relationship with Peru and the resulting 
cooperation on drug enforcement.
90
 Additionally, the United States had 
chosen to work on Peru‘s human rights situation through alternate means, 
choosing to negotiate rather than adopt a hard line.
91
 In Kohatsu‘s case, the 
same factors were not present and the United States took a hands-off 
approach that fell in line with its wider policy of both hostility toward 
universal criminal jurisdiction and a favoring of alternate means of 
enforcing international norms. The unique circumstances of Taylor‘s case, 
in light of past United States practices, lead to the conclusion that his case 
is an outlier rather than a new frontier in American attitudes.  
IV. EUROPEAN PRACTICE AS A COUNTERPOINT 
For many years after World War II, American attitudes toward the use 
of domestic tribunals to punish violations of international law were similar 
to those of the majority of states.
92
 However, international practice has 
changed, and commentators have noticed ―a trend towards a global desire 
to protect human rights,‖ evidenced by increasing use of universal 
 
 
 84. Aaron Solomon, The Politics of Prosecutions under the Convention Against Torture, 2 CHI. 
J. INT‘L L. 309, 309 (2001). 
 85. State Dept. Helped Peruvian Accused of Torture Avoid Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2000, at 
A7. Proffered evidence linked Kohatsu to the torture of a former Peruvian intelligence operative who 
was left a paraplegic as a result. Id. 
 86. Solomon, supra note 84, at 311. 
 87. Morrissey, supra note 9. 
 88. Envoy Freed Despite Torture Charge, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2000, at 15. The State 
Department cited diplomatic immunity as the primary reason for their refusal to allow the Department 
of Justice to proceed with the indictment. Id. 
 89. Morrissey, supra note 9, at 3.  
 90. Solomon, supra note 84, at 311. 
 91. Id. at 312. 
 92. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 5, at 146. 
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jurisdiction.
93
 The United States‘ reluctance to use universal criminal 
jurisdiction stands in stark contrast to the practices of other Western 
nations.
94
 In the 1990s, Austria,
95
 Belgium,
96
 Denmark,
97
 France,
98
 
Germany,
99
 the Netherlands,
100
 Spain,
101
 Switzerland,
102
 and the United 
Kingdom
103
 all exercised universal jurisdiction as a means of punishing 
individual violators of human rights. In particular, Spain and Belgium 
have exercised jurisdiction far beyond anything the United States has ever 
attempted.
104
 Their practices provide a striking contrast to the 
conservativism of the American position. 
 
 
 93. Gene Bykhovsky, An Argument Against Assertion of Universal Jurisdiction by Individual 
States, 21 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 161, 164 (2003). 
 94. See generally Diane F. Orentlicher, Whose Justice? Reconciling Universal Jurisdiction with 
Democratic Principles, 92 GEO. L.J. 1057 (2004) (describing the use of universal jurisdiction by 
various countries). 
 95. FIONA MCKAY, REDRESS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
IN EUROPE SINCE 1990 FOR WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, TORTURE AND GENOCIDE 1, 
16–17 (1999), available at http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/UJEurope.pdf. Austria 
indicted a Bosnian Serb accused of participating in the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims. Id. 
 96. Belgium tried four Rwandans for their participation in the 1994 genocide and sought 
extradition of a fifth. Additionally, the Belgian courts ruled that Belgium had jurisdiction to try 
General Augusto Pinochet for his alleged crimes. Id. at 19–21. 
 97. Denmark successfully tried and convicted a Bosnian Muslim for torture committed in a 
Croat-run prison in Bosnia. Id. at 22–23. 
 98. Id. at 26. France indicted a Rwandan accused of participating in the genocide. Additionally, 
France initiated investigations into abuses in the Congo that resulted in the arrest of General Norbert 
Dabira, the Inspector-General of the Congolese Armed Forces. See Certain Criminal Proceedings in 
France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. 102 (June 17). More recently, France issued a warrant for the arrest 
of Rwandan leader Paul Kagame‘s chief of protocol, Rose Kibuye, which was carried out on 
November 2008 in Frankfurt, Germany. France charged Kibuye with involvement in the 1994 death of 
former Rwandan leader Juvenal Habyarimana. Rwandan Says Arrest of Aide Was a Violation of 
Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at A8.  
 99. Germany originally indicted four Bosnian Serbs for activities such as genocide and ethnic 
cleansing. One was transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, but 
the other three were tried in German domestic courts. MCKAY, supra note 95, at 29. 
 100. Id. at 35. The Netherlands indicted a Bosnian Serb for his activities during the civil war in the 
former Yugoslavia and has prosecuted Sebastien Nzapali, a former Congolese colonel, for crimes 
against humanity in the DRC during the civil war of the 1990s. Dutch Hold Congo War Crimes Trial, 
BBC NEWS, Jan. 7, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3374913.stm.  
 101. MCKAY, supra note 95, at 38–40. The Spanish courts first sought indictments and 
extraditions related to the ―Dirty War‖ in Argentina. Spain most famously indicted former Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet, although there have also been a number of extradition requests more 
recently for Guatemalan military leaders accused of engaging in human rights abuses. Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, Making the State Do Justice: Transnational Prosecutions and International Support for 
Criminal Investigations in Post-Armed Conflict Guatemala, 9 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 79 (2008).  
 102. The Swiss government has tried a Bosnian Serb and a Rwandan for crimes arising from the 
human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. MCKAY, supra note 95, at 41–42. 
 103. A court in Scotland tried a Sudanese defendant for torture, and the United Kingdom‘s court 
system decided in favor of deporting Pinochet to Spain in order to stand trial. Id. at 44–45. 
 104. For more information on Spain‘s practices, see Roht-Arriaza, supra note 101. See also 
Mugambi Jouet, Spain‟s Expanded Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human Rights Abuses in Latin 
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A. Belgium 
Belgium has long been at the forefront of the universal jurisdiction 
movement.
105
 As discussed previously, Belgium‘s law wasn‘t the first of 
its kind, but it was the most all-encompassing.
106
 The first exercise of the 
Belgian universal jurisdiction statute came in 2001, when it tried four 
Rwandans for crimes committed during the 1994 genocide.
107
 This 
exercise was perhaps not as revolutionary as it seemed, as all four 
defendants were found in Belgium.
108
 Nonetheless, it proved to be a 
successful demonstration that courts with no ties to a particular set of 
events could successfully try cases of human rights violations, and went 
largely unchallenged.
109
 
However, the next case the Belgian courts undertook was far more 
radical. Belgium charged Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo‘s (―DRC‖) acting Minister of Foreign Affairs,110 
with ―grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and crimes against 
humanity.‖111 Belgium then sought Yerodia‘s extradition from the DRC in 
order to try him in Belgium.
112
 The DRC resisted and filed a complaint 
with the International Court of Justice (―ICJ‖),113 which ultimately resulted 
in the court finding against Belgium and ordering it to rescind the warrant 
for Yerodia‘s arrest.114 Despite the fact that Belgium did not prevail, the 
state stood strongly for the belief that it had the power to assert universal 
 
 
America, China, and Beyond, 35 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 495 (2007); NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, THE 
PINOCHET EFFECT: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2005). For Belgium, see 
ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra, at 186–93. See also Mohamed M. El Zeidy, Universal Jurisdiction in 
Absentia: Is It a Legal Valid Option for Repressing Heinous Crimes?, 37 INT‘L L. 835 (2003); Ratner, 
supra note 44; Verhaeghe, supra note 44.  
 105. Jouet, supra note 104, at 501.  
 106. Ratner, supra note 42, at 889. Roht-Arriaza asserts that Belgium‘s statute was revolutionary 
as it allowed absolute universal jurisdiction—allowing cases to proceed without the presence of the 
defendant in the forum state, and permitting anyone, including plaintiffs not resident in Belgium, to 
press charges. The statute was so far-reaching that it even abrogated traditional immunity for sitting 
heads of state. ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 104, at 186. 
 107. The defendants included ―two Benedictine nuns, a former professor at the National 
University of Rwanda . . . and a former businessman and [government] minister.‖ Bassiouni, supra 
note 36, at 145–46. 
 108. Id. at 146. 
 109. Ratner, supra note 44, at 894.  
 110. Bassiouni, supra note 36, at 146. 
 111. ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 104, at 186. 
 112. Bassiouni, supra note 36, at 146–47.  
 113. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 39. 
 114. ROHT-ARRIAZA, supra note 104, at 186. For more discussion of the Yerodia case and the 
ICJ‘s ruling on head of state immunity, see Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 1016–18 (2006).  
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jurisdiction to punish serious crimes, regardless of the location of the 
defendant or his position within a government, a stance it has maintained 
in other situations as well.
115
  
B. Spain 
Spain‘s foray into the exercise of universal jurisdiction also provides a 
stark counterpoint to the American position. In recent years Spanish courts 
have been involved in attempted prosecutions of former Chilean leader 
Augusto Pinochet, members of the Guatemalan junta and several 
individuals accused of committing atrocities during Argentina‘s ―Dirty 
War.‖116 Although the Spanish Supreme Court sought to narrow the reach 
of Spanish extraterritorial jurisdiction in the wake of these high-profile 
cases, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal overruled it, asserting that no 
link to the prosecuting state was required in order to exercise 
jurisdiction.
117
  
Clearly the Pinochet case is the most obvious example of Spain‘s use 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In 1996, ―a Spanish prosecutor filed a 
complaint against Pinochet‖ based on the alleged commission of human 
rights abuses during his tenure as leader of Chile.
118
 An arrest warrant was 
issued for Pinochet on the basis that he was accused of involvement in the 
murder of Spanish nationals and, with the cooperation of the British House 
of Lords, Pinochet was to be extradited and sent to Spain to stand trial.
119
 
 
 
 115. Bassiouni, supra note 36, at 147–48. For another example of Belgium‘s attempts to assert 
universal jurisdiction over foreign heads of state, see Tanaz Moghadam, Note, Revitalizing Universal 
Jurisdiction: Lessons From Hybrid Tribunals Applied to the Case of Hissène Habré, 39 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 471 (2008), in which the author discusses Belgium‘s attempted involvement in the case 
of former president of Chad, Hissène Habré.  
 116. Jouet, supra note 104, at 496–97.  
 117. Id. at 497.  
 118. Hasson, supra note 21, at 147. The complaint alleged that, after the overthrow of the 
democratically elected president, Salvador Allende, Pinochet launched a campaign of torture against 
thousands of people in an effort to eliminate possible opponents. Id. Some commentators have asserted 
that the Spanish Audencia National actually ―defied international law‖ in its indictment of Pinochet for 
genocide against a ―national group,‖ which is defined as ―a differentiated human group, characterized 
by some trait, and integrated into the larger collectivity.‖ Anthony Colangelo, The Legal Limits of 
Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. INT‘L L. 149, 180 (2006). Spain asserted that the targeting of political 
opponents constituted genocide, but Colangelo notes that this is somewhat of a stretch, given the fact 
that the genocide label typically requires national, racial, ethnic, or religious ties. Id. Nonetheless, the 
international polity seemed to go along with Spain‘s definition despite the fact that the Genocide 
Convention specifically excludes political groups as victim classes. Id. at 181. It seems that the 
international (or perhaps European) desire was to see extraterritorial jurisdiction used to punish 
Pinochet, whatever the justification.  
 119. Moghadam, supra note 115, at 480–81. The British House of Lords, when faced with the 
Spanish extradition request, held that, as the United Kingdom was a signatory of the Torture 
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While Spain was not ultimately able to prosecute Pinochet in its courts, 
commentators have noted that ―the Pinochet case represented a high-water 
mark for universal jurisdiction.‖120 
Less high-profile, but perhaps more important, is Spain‘s involvement 
in the prosecution of alleged human rights abuses in Guatemala.
121
 During 
the Guatemalan internal conflict from 1960–1996, two hundred thousand 
people were killed and four hundred thousand disappeared.
122
 Accusations 
were made that the military had targeted members of the Mayan ethnic 
minority, and when the Guatemalan government refused to act, aggrieved 
Guatemalans petitioned the Spanish courts for help.
123
 The courts took 
jurisdiction and began a process of investigation that culminated in the 
issuance of charges and international arrest warrants for people who 
committed crimes unrelated to the Spanish polity.
124
 Astonishingly, 
Guatemala‘s government reacted to the warrants by placing the accused in 
custody for a year, although the government ultimately refused to extradite 
them.
125
 Nonetheless, Spain has doggedly continued to pursue the case, 
and since February 2008, the judge overseeing it has brought numbers of 
Guatemalan witnesses to Spain in order to testify.
126
 While there is 
uncertainty as to the end results of Spain‘s involvement, commentators 
have noted that Spain‘s case has brought the matter to light and is forcing 
the Guatemalan government to address in some way the legacies of the 
internal conflict.
127
 
In comparison with the work of Belgium, Spain, and numerous other 
European states, the United States‘ overall attitude toward universal 
 
 
Convention and the Convention formed part of British domestic law, the U.K. had the power to 
exercise jurisdiction over Pinochet for crimes relating to the substance of the treaty. On a related note, 
the House of Lords also chose to reject Pinochet‘s claim of head of state immunity as the body decided 
that such immunity represented a violation of jus cogens norms. Id.  
 120. Id. at 482. After the Spanish authorities released Pinochet for health reasons, he was returned 
to Chile where the authorities immediately indicted him. Ultimately, charges relating to the 
commission of homicides and kidnappings during his tenure as leader were dismissed, leaving only 
charges concerning his role in the cover-up of the alleged atrocities. The process was finally derailed 
when a Chilean appeals court ruled that Pinochet was not well enough to stand trial. Hasson, supra 
note 21, at 148–49.  
 121. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 101. 
 122. The figures were supplied by the U.N.-sponsored Commission on Historical Clarification, 
which accused the Guatemalan military of having committed genocide in specific areas of the country. 
Id. at 83. 
 123. Id. at 84.  
 124. Id. at 88.  
 125. Id. at 80. The accused included the country‘s ex-President, the ex-Defense Minister, the ex-
Police Chief, and the former head of the Secret Police. Id. at 79. 
 126. Id. at 100.  
 127. Id. at 101.  
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jurisdiction seems almost reactionary. The reluctance to embrace the 
practice, even in relation to jus cogens crimes, is evidenced by the fact that 
the United States continues to require a more traditional basis for 
jurisdiction before becoming involved in war crimes prosecutions.  
V. AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF THE AMERICAN POSITION 
While the use of universal jurisdiction to combat impunity is an 
admirable exercise, it seems that there are too many problems associated 
with universal jurisdiction to make it a feasible means of punishing jus 
cogens violations on a global scale. On the most general level, there are 
procedural issues such as obtaining physical control of perpetrators and 
investigating crimes that took place thousands of miles away.
128
 There are 
other, less concrete problems as well, such as the potential infringement of 
states‘ sovereignty, the lack of interaction with victims, and the 
imperialistic overtones of Western states‘ involvement with the internal 
issues of states of the developing world.
129
 
A. Procedural Difficulties 
The issues inherent in trying a case where the crime took place 
thousands of miles away are obvious. Primary among them is the problem 
of obtaining physical custody of a given defendant. The difficulties 
encountered in Spain‘s prosecution of Guatemalan leaders provide an 
excellent example.
130
 In cases where another state has stepped in to 
prosecute human rights violations, it can be generally stated that the legal 
system in the home state is either flawed or not functioning.
131
 Naomi 
 
 
 128. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 101. See also Hasson, supra note 21; Joanne Brockman, 
Liberia: The Case For Changing U.N. Processes For Humanitarian Interventions, 22 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 
711 (2004); Chernor Jalloh & Alhagi Marong, Ending Impunity: The Case for War Crimes Trials in 
Liberia, 1 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2005).  
 129. See Bykhovsky, supra note 93; Erika R. George, After Atrocity Examples from Africa: The 
Right to Education and the Role of Law in Restoration, Recovery, and Accountability, 5 LOY. U. CHI. 
INT‘L L. REV. 59 (2007); Okechukwu Oko, The Challenges of International Criminal Prosecutions in 
Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 343 (2008); Maya Sosnov, The Adjudication of Genocide: Gacaca and 
the Road to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 36 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 125 (2008); Linda E. Carter, 
Justice and Reconciliation on Trial: Gacaca Proceedings in Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. J. INT‘L & COMP. 
L. 41 (2007).  
 130. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 101.  
 131. Ratner, supra note 44, at 894–95, referring to Ratner‘s factors that favor the exercise of 
extraterritorial or universal jurisdiction over crimes relating to another state. Roht-Arriaza asserts that, 
in the Guatemala case, the ―prosecutors‘ office remained ineffective, disrespectful to victims, and 
vulnerable to threats and corruption,‖ and was compromised by the military and criminal elements. 
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 101, at 86.  
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Roht-Arriaza also notes that the figures involved in the ordering of such 
atrocities usually retain a fair amount of power, even if they are no longer 
in leadership.
132
 With central weakness and power remaining in the hands 
of former government officials, it is small wonder that states such as Spain 
and Belgium have experienced difficulty successfully obtaining the 
extradition of accused human rights abusers.
133
  
The inability to obtain physical custody renders the entire procedure 
largely moot; while ―trials offer a transitional mechanism for normative 
transformation to express public condemnation of aspects of the past,‖134 
the impossibility of exacting punishment on absent defendants undermines 
the process. When a court passes a meaningless judgment on a defendant it 
cannot reach, it renders the case a farce—there may be a manifestation of 
international revulsion for the acts, but the defendant has not truly been 
held accountable. In this respect, it is similar to amnesty in that there is 
knowledge of the commission of a crime, but the perpetrators still go 
free.
135
 Such practices indicate to victims that those responsible for their 
suffering are unlikely ever to be subject to substantial justice, undermining 
the entire process.
136
 
In the same vein, the difficulties of mounting a distant investigation in 
the face of a hostile government can undercut the effectiveness of 
international intervention in human rights cases. There are the general 
difficulties of obtaining specific information and witness testimony;
137
 
hostile states can prevent outside investigators from having access to 
witnesses and other important evidence required to build a case,
138
 and the 
 
 
 132. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 101, at 81.  
 133. See, for example, Roht-Arriaza, supra note 101 for the previously mentioned discussion of 
Guatemala‘s refusal to extradite those accused of atrocities against the Mayan people. She asserts that 
―[t]he Achilles heel of all international justice efforts . . . is the inability to execute arrest warrants‖ 
against important figures deeply involved in the commission of human rights violations. Id. at 97. See 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 39 for the DRC‘s response to Belgium‘s attempted 
extradition of Yerodia.  
 134. Scott, supra note 80, at 397. 
 135. Id. at 391–92. Amnesties are often criticized for ―capitulat[ing] to past perpetrators‖ and for 
failing to help post-conflict countries internalize the importance of honoring human rights. As a result, 
it is argued, amnesty helps pave the way for further impunity because there is ultimately a lack of true 
responsibility. Id.  
 136. Brockman, supra note 14, at 739. Brockman argues that allowing leaders who have 
committed heinous crimes to remain at large ―sends the wrong message‖ to both victims and 
perpetrators and dangerously weakens the process of rebuilding and reconciliation in post-conflict 
states. Id. at 738. 
 137. Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspirations 
and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 635, 679 (2007).  
 138. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 101, at 100. In the Guatemalan case, the Guatemalan court system 
had ruled that Spain had no jurisdiction to try the case, and so the prosecutor was barred from going to 
Guatemala to conduct interviews and undertake on-the-spot investigations. Id. at 80. 
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poverty of victims can make it impossible for them to travel the distances 
required in order to provide testimony.
139
 In addition, international rulings 
have limited tribunals‘ ability to subpoena documents from high-level 
officials acting in their official capacities.
140
 Without the safeguards of 
proper investigation and evidence-gathering, what is intended to be a 
method of exacting justice could devolve into a biased quest
141
 for 
retribution and blame assignation by the international community, which 
will then congratulate itself on upholding its obligations to safeguard 
human rights.
142
 
B. Legitimacy Issues 
The American position is admirable for other reasons. The choice to 
prosecute cases in distant fora creates issues surrounding state 
sovereignty,
143
 lack of interface with victims,
144
 and the specter of 
continuing Western imperialism.
145
 Hybrid tribunals, combining elements 
of local and international justice, seem to be a better solution than 
extraterritorial prosecution.
146
  
The international legal system is built on the ―dignity of the foreign 
nation, its organs and representatives, and the functional need to leave 
 
 
 139. Id. at 101. When a Guatemalan judge chose to assist with Spain‘s investigation by 
interviewing victims himself, he was unable to do so without the government providing funds to pay 
for witnesses‘ travel to the court. Id.  
 140. Gordon, supra note 137, at 678. The ICC ruled in Prosecutor v. Blaskic that, while 
international tribunals could issue subpoenas with which states were required to comply, they could 
not attempt to require compliance with subpoenas from state officials acting in their official capacity. 
Id.  
 141. Bykhovsky, supra note 93, at 175. Bykhovsky argues that, while states may claim to be 
unbiased, there are usually links to one party or another, and this is another point that undermines the 
legitimacy of the end result. Id.  
 142. Gordon, supra note 137, at 710. Professor Gordon makes the point that desire for revenge 
against the most heinous of perpetrators—such as Saddam Hussein—creates a situation in which the 
international polity may be out for blood, whatever the price. Id. He quotes Justice Murphy‘s dissent in 
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), a case from post-war Japan: 
[A]n uncurbed spirit of revenge and retribution, masked in formal legal procedure for 
purposes of dealing with a fallen enemy commander, can do more lasting harm than all of the 
atrocities giving rise to that spirit. The people‘s faith in the fairness and objectiveness of the 
law can be seriously undercut by that spirit.  
Gordon, supra note 137, at 710.  
 143. See Bykhovsky, supra note 93, at 177–79. 
 144. See George, supra note 5, at 71 for a discussion of the problems encountered with the 
remoteness from the victims of the Rwandan tribunal in Arusha.  
 145. Oko, supra note 129, at 365–66.  
 146. Jalloh & Marong, supra note 14, at 69. See George, supra note 5, at 72–76 for an 
examination of the hybrid tribunal experience in Sierra Leone. 
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them unencumbered‖ in the governance of the state.147 The involvement of 
a third-party state in the purely domestic matters of another nation violates 
notions of sovereignty, authority, and immunity for states and 
individuals.
148
 Such action can be characterized as an external tyranny, as 
there has been no consent to the unilateral imposition of outside authority 
on a state‘s citizenry,149 and creates a system in which it is possible for one 
state to sit in judgment of the sovereign acts of another.
150
 While some 
scholars argue that universal jurisdiction is an important tool in punishing 
violations of jus cogens norms,
151
 it also has the potential effect of 
destroying confidence in the state‘s ability to administer binding justice 
within its own boundaries.
152
 
The breach of state sovereignty represented by the use of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction can also give rise to claims of judicial 
imperialism.
153
 Generally, the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction is 
confined to developed nations
154
 and the target state is usually a 
developing nation.
155
 The end result is a proceeding with paternalistic 
overtones that parties on the receiving end interpret as a manifestation of 
neo-colonialism.
156
 Returning to the point raised in the discussion of 
 
 
 147. Bykhovsky, supra note 93, at 177.  
 148. Christopher Hale, Does the Evolution of International Criminal Law End with the ICC? The 
“Roaming ICC”: A Model International Criminal Court for a State-Centric World of International 
Law, 35 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 429, 440–41 (2007). Hale asserts that ―antiquated‖ notions about 
sovereignty are often stumbling blocks to the widespread use of universal jurisdiction, while 
acknowledging that its use must fit within the dominant Westphalian sovereignty model. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Bykhovsky, supra note 93, at 178. 
 151. See Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, 
at 150, 150 (2001) (Universal jurisdiction offers ―a measure of solace to victims and their families and 
raising the possibility that would-be tyrants will begin to think before embarking on a barbarous 
path.‖).  
 152. Bykhovsky, supra note 93, at 178.  
 153. Oko, supra note 129, at 354.  
 154. See Moghadam, supra note 115, at 484. ―The roster of countries that currently have universal 
jurisdiction statutes reads like a list of names off an epitaph to colonialism: Belgium, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom.‖ Id. at 484–85. The Hissène Habré case is 
the sole example of a state from the developing world attempting to exercise universal jurisdiction. Id. 
at 484. 
 155. Id. at 484. For a list of examples of individuals indicted or tried as a result of the use of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, see supra notes 92–104. Although the REDRESS Report from which the 
examples are drawn does not include all uses of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it seems to provide a fairly 
representative sampling of accused perpetrators. See supra notes 92–104. 
 156. Anita Frölich, Reconciling Peace with Justice: A Cooperative Division of Labor, 30 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT‘L L. REV. 271, 295 (2007). Frölich points out that former colonial states, such as 
Spain and Belgium, most often pursue universal jurisdiction in their former possessions. See also Oko, 
supra note 129, at 366 for a discussion of the feelings such undertakings raise in the members of post-
colonial societies. Oko asserts that there is a great deal of anti-Western sentiment in the African states 
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sovereignty, nations using extraterritorial jurisdiction are outsiders without 
a mandate,
157
 and commentators note that Western legal tradition does not 
always match the needs and desires of targeted states.
158
 As a 
consequence, international prosecutions of human rights abusers are often 
met with suspicion and hostility born of years of colonialism, as opposed 
to providing a means of reconciliation and renewal.
159
 
These attitudes combine with the distance of the extraterritorial forum 
to create a disconnect between the victims and the mechanisms of 
justice.
160
 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (―ICTR‖) 
provides an excellent example of this process. The location of the tribunal 
in Arusha, Tanzania led to a ―limited role for and attention to the needs of 
the victims,‖161 difficulty with coordinating witness testimony, inadequate 
provision of information to the Rwandan public about the proceedings,
162
 
and far less accountability to the victims.
163
 Ultimately, justice is not 
merely a punitive exercise. Rather, there should be provision for victims‘ 
rights to be vindicated, and removing the proceeding entirely from the 
domestic court system and the population affected by the atrocities also 
 
 
against which extraterritorial jurisdiction is most often exercised, creating a situation in which the 
public is demoralized and disinterested and feels it has little stake in the ultimate outcome. Id. 
 157. Bykhovsky, supra note 93, at 179. 
 158. George, supra note 5, at 71–72. George points to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (―ICTR‖) as an example of African resistance to one-size-fits-all international adjudication. 
She notes that Rwanda was the only state to oppose the institution of the ICTR for a number of 
reasons, including its failure to include a provision for capital punishment. Id. Oko notes that the death 
penalty is generally available in most African countries, and the U.N.‘s failure to provide for its use 
undermines the legitimacy of international adjudication. Oko, supra note 129, at 369. ―[F]or most 
Africans, especially the victims of brutality, the only penalty they seek for their abusers is the death 
penalty.‖ Id. at 370. As a result of the ICTR‘s inefficiency and illegitimacy, Rwandans looked 
elsewhere, developing the gacaca system, which ―embraced traditional Rwandan values by embracing 
restoration over retribution.‖ Cecily Rose, Looking Beyond Amnesty and Traditional Justice and 
Reconciliation Mechanisms in Northern Uganda: A Proposal for Truth-telling and Reparations, 28 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 345, 387 (2008).  
 159. Oko, supra note 129, at 366. 
 160. See id. at 371; George, supra note 5, at 71; Scott, supra note 80, at 406. 
 161. George, supra note 5, at 71. 
 162. Scott, supra note 80, at 406. 
 163. Oko, supra note 129, at 374. Oko quotes the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR, Hassan B. Jallow: 
[T]he holding of trials in Arusha, Tanzania, far away from the theatre of genocide distances 
the people of Rwanda from a process designed to render justice to its people. For the people 
to feel that justice was being done, the criminal justice system ought ideally to operate within 
sight and hearing of the victims themselves.  
Id. at 372. Human Rights Watch noted that such proceedings created a situation in which the far-away 
trials lacked visibility in the countries where the atrocities had been carried out, and were often 
inaccessible for those who would derive the greatest benefit from participating in the proceedings—the 
victims and ―those in whose name the crimes were committed.‖ Id. at 372–73.  
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removes the opportunity for the victims to derive this benefit from the 
prosecution.
164
  
Taking all of the above-mentioned factors into account, U.S. reluctance 
to undertake extraterritorial prosecutions under the universal jurisdiction 
standard is commendable. A conservative approach fosters a need to find 
better alternatives. Of all of the ways in which the international 
community has attempted to handle the administration of justice, hybrid 
tribunals offer the best opportunity for local participation under the 
watchful eye of international observers.
165
 These tribunals combine local 
and international law and judicial frameworks and are usually sited within 
the country itself.
166
 Their use in these situations should be encouraged. 
Hybrid tribunals allow the international community some involvement, 
while still providing responsiveness to the needs of the affected 
population.
167
 Such courts make it possible for post-conflict nations to 
provide justice, to signal a move away from impunity, and to rebuild the 
justice system and the rule of law.
168
 Additionally, the fact that this type of 
tribunal takes into account the country‘s judicial norms by including local 
courts, advocates, and legal frameworks enhances legitimacy and prevents 
the perception of the unilateral imposition of outside justice.
169
 
Extraterritorial prosecutions do none of these things. While there may be 
concern about the ability of post-conflict nations to dispense on-the-
ground justice, it is a great deal more concerning not to allow the nations 
and their citizens to be involved at all.
170
  
 
 
 164. Id. at 371.  
 165. Brian Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the „Responsibility to Protect‟: A Repertoire of 
Measures Including Asylum for Potential Victims, 20 INT‘L J. REFUGEE L. 533, 544–45 (2008). Most 
recently, hybrid tribunals have also been set up in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon, among other 
places. Id. They have also been established in East Timor and Kosovo. Etelle Higonnet, Restructuring 
Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT‘L & 
COMP. L. 347, 353 (2006). While the tribunals in Kosovo and East Timor were established and 
managed by the U.N., the most recent incarnations of these tribunals are the result of negotiations and 
cooperation between the U.N. and the sovereign nation involved. Id. at 355. 
 166. Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 295, 295 (2003). In 
hybrid tribunals, ―[f]oreign judges sit alongside their domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and 
defended by teams of local lawyers working with those from other countries. The judges apply 
domestic law that has been reformed to accord with international standards.‖ Id. The hybrid model has 
been most commonly used in post-conflict countries where the U.N. has not established an ad hoc 
tribunal and no acceptable local alternative exists. Id. 
 167. Laurence Juma, The Human Rights Approach to Peace in Sierra Leone: The Analysis of the 
Peace Process and Human Rights Enforcement in a Civil War Situation, 30 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 
325, 369 (2002).  
 168. Scott, supra note 80, at 384.  
 169. Dickinson, supra note 166, at 306.  
 170. Higonnet, supra note 165, at 358. Higonnet asserts that, in order to assist post-conflict 
nations in reforming their societies, the U.N. and the international community ―‗cannot display an 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented in this Note demonstrates that the prosecution 
of Charles Taylor Jr. under the ETS does not mark a major change of 
direction for the United States, but instead illustrates American reluctance 
to join the international extraterritorial prosecution movement. In the 
Taylor case, the United States relied on traditional theories of international 
jurisdiction, and continuing U.S. practice evinces a preference for the use 
of civil proceedings to fulfill its CAT duties. It seems clear that the United 
States will probably not embrace the Belgian or Spanish practices of 
universal jurisdiction; such a position is defensible, if not laudable. The 
removal of victims‘ power to participate in the prosecution of human 
rights abuses raises a host of both procedural and legitimacy questions and 
should be eschewed in favor of the more cooperative model of hybrid 
tribunals, where both post-conflict states and the international community 
can cooperate in order to secure justice for victims of serious human rights 
violations. 
Laura Richardson Brownlee  
 
 
elitist, paternalistic attitude‘ toward war crimes victims and national judiciaries, ‗i.e., viewing local 
participation as inherently biased, tribal, inexperienced and inept.‖ Id. (citation omitted). Otherwise, 
there is the potentiality of ―perpetual international oversight—at once unsustainable in practical terms, 
and dubious in moral terms, given its inherent imperialism.‖ Id.  
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